The German Basic Law constitutes federalism as a unique political system which is characterised by intertwined decision-making of the Federation (Bund) and the component units (Länder). The executives of the two federal tiers and the Länder executives within the Bundesrat play a major role in making joint decisions. They are forced to make decisions in the 'joint-decision mode' (Politikverflechtung) which is detrimental to accountability. Reform efforts were made to unbundle competences and to reduce the number of bills which require the Bundesrat's consent. Due to the dominance of the executives and the distribution of powers between the federal tiers (legislation is dominated by the Bund, execution is dominated by the Länder), German federalism is rightly called 'executive federalism'.
The two legislative bodies of the German federation
The German constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law = BL), provides for two 'legislative bodies' (cf. Articles 55, 59 para. 2, 122 para. 1 BL): the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. While the Bundestag is the main legislative body whose primary task is to adopt bills (Article 77 para. 1 BL), the Bundesrat's task as a legislative body is either to give or to refuse its consent or -depending on the constitutional arrangement -to object to the bill in question if necessary (Article 77 paras 2-4 BL). Thus, bills are not jointly adopted by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat but by the Bundestag alone with, however, different forms of participation of the Bundesrat (cf. Article 78 BL).
Depending on the constitutionally stipulated form of participation of the Bundesrat in the law-making procedure -either a necessity for consent or the possibility to object to a bill -the political composition of the Bundesrat may become important. In the early years of the German constitution, the Bundesrat was considered 'unpolitical': a bureaucratic institution without strong political power. But this changed in the early 1970s; from that time on, the Bundesrat emerged as a 'politicised' institution, a (potential) opponent to the federal government (Oeter 1998: 322 et seq.) .
However, compared to the Bundestag, the Bundesrat is still an institution that is dominated by administrative expertise rather than by political debate (Sturm 2009: 147) .
The reason for this is the composition of the Bundesrat, which consists of members of the Land governments, which are not necessarily -and are often not -composed in the same way as the federal government or the majority in the Bundestag. Rather, depending on the outcome of the Land elections, the Bundesrat may form a forum for the federal opposition (Oeter 1998: 322 et seq.) . Irrespective of its composition, the Bundesrat is a federal institution (Risse 2005: 11 ) and as such not only dedicated to the Länder's interests but also to the interests of the Federation. E -204 (3), Saxony (4), maybe also Saxony-Anhalt (4). The number of votes in favour of the federal government would be 26, which is not a majority (= 35). However, the member parties of the new 'grand' coalition also participate individually in other Land governments.
Thus, currently a clear 'blocking potential' cannot be deduced from the above table.
The 'politicisation' of the Bundesrat and the -prior and continuing -increase in the number of bills requiring the Bundesrat's consent has raised concerns. Depending on its political composition the Bundesrat was ascribed the putative power to block the legislative activities of the Bundestag, or the Federation as such, and to cause legislative gridlock. Even though no empirical verification has been provided for this assumption (cf. Schöbener 2010, Article 50 BL mn. 129; Eith and Siewert 2010: 116; Sturm 2009: 145) , the Bundesrat's potential for blockade was seen as problematic. Therefore, reform efforts were made to reduce that potential. Those efforts will be dealt with below (6.). As a 'legislative body' the Bundesrat's task is to take part in the Federation's legislation. To conclude, German federalism is constituted as a bicameral system with two legislative bodies which are functionally the two chambers of the German parliament.
The German

The German Bundesrat and 'executive federalism'
The German constitutional system if often referred to as 'executive federalism'; it even seems that German federalism can be regarded as an embodiment of that concept, and the Bundesrat plays an important role in that characterisation. Before dealing with the concept of 'executive federalism' it must be distinguished from other types of federalism. Dann It goes without saying that the three types mentioned above represent very broad concepts. As Federico Fabbrini has stated, the notion 'executive federalism' is multifaceted (Fabbrini 2015: 289) . Not surprisingly, the definitions proposed by scholars from several disciplines differ considerably in detail but have a common core in that they stress the modes of execution of laws or the dominant role of the executive branch. All in all, it seems that scholars use their own definition tailored for their particular purposes. This is reflected in the following definitions. 
Summary
Germany is a federal state with two state tiers: the Bund (federation) and the Länder The legislative function of the Bundesrat makes it a 'legislative body' (Article 55; cf. also 59 para. 2 Basic Law). However, the question of whether to call the Bundesrat a 'second chamber' of a German parliament is disputed; formally, this is not the case but functionally the Bundesrat must be regarded as a 'second chamber'. However, to call the Bundesrat a 'second chamber' or not is not significant for the legal scope of its constitutional role. At the EU level, though, it is important for the Bundesrat to be regarded as a second chamber.
The constitutional design of the Bundesrat has necessarily led to intertwined (joint) decision-making (according to Fritz W. Scharpf) which has frequently drawn criticism, and reform efforts are aimed at unbundling legislative competences of the two federal tiers as well as at reforming the Bundesrat itself. The latter proposals include the introduction of a 
